Editorial Review:
You and Your Organization Are at Risk Were the earth-shattering events of September 11, 2001, predictable, or were they a surprise? What about the collapse of Enron in bankruptcy and scandal? Max H. Bazerman and Michael D. Watkins argue that they were actually "predictable surprises"-disastrous examples of the failure to recognize potential tragedies and actively work to prevent them. Disturbingly, this dangerous phenomenon has its roots in universal human and organizational tendencies that leave no individual or company immune. In this riveting book, Bazerman and Watkins, leading experts in managerial decision making, show that many disasters are preceded by clear warning signals that leaders either miss-or purposely ignore. They explain the cognitive, organizational, and political biases that make predictable surprises so common in business and society, and outline six danger signals that suggest a predictable surprise may be imminent. They also provide a systematic framework that leaders can use to recognize and prioritize brewing disasters and mobilize their organizations to prevent them. Filled with vivid accounts of predictable surprises in business and society across public and private sectors, this book highlights a phenomenon that holds grave consequences-and challenges leaders to find the courage to act before it's too late. A Leadership for the Common Good book Published in partnership with the Center for Public Leadership
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Customer Reviews
Average Customer Rating: 
This is a great business book! 2008-08-11
This book underscores how well-wishing and positive thinking are not effective ways of handling risks of business.
It's a great book to help you get past the human tendancies to think and hope and actually PLAN for the future.
Enlightening  2007-08-27
The book jumps around but makes clear and valid points. A great eye opener! I would recommend this to students, leaders, informed citizens...just about anybody. I'm definitely getting more copies for friends and loved ones.
On Target - Bullseye - Should have seen it coming 2005-10-07
Anyone who has worked for some sort of organization, government agency, business, university or whatever, will empathise with "Predictable Surprises" by Bazerman and Watkins. This book focuses on the early and late warning signs, the cover-ups, the denials, and the eventual consequences of failing to take action to avert disaster. I've been in far too many situations where I observed that the peple "in charge" (really??) were blindsided by their own limited vision to the realities of what was happening within their organizations.
There are two "Predictable Surprises" that weren't included. First, Hurricane Katrina and the aftermath in New Orleans. Anyone visiting that city and talking with one's professional compatriates could have seen coming what unfolded before our eyes. The warning signs and studies were out there and ignored. That's why those who had a reasonable level of education left town and paid attention to the evacuation notices.
The other predictable surprise that was missed was the sex abuse scandal in the Roman Catholic Church. I'm Protestant but know a lot of fine Roman Catholic people. I heard things as long ago as fifty years and knew then that this situation was going to explode in the public domain. "Predictable Surprises" provides the principals that explain why this particular surprise was kept under the radar so long.
An outstanding book that should be read by everyone working in the corporate world, a government agency, a university, the military, or a non-profit organization. Your life may depend on knowing what's in this book.
Predictably bad  2005-06-14
A major shortcoming of Bazerman and Watkins' book is the failure to provide adequate evidence to support their arguments about what they call "predictable surprises", which they define as "an event or series of events that take an individual or group by surprise, despite prior awareness of all of the information necessary to anticipate the events and their consequences." Bazerman and Watkins build their case substantially on just two examples: aviation security failures leading to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and auditor independence concerns leading to the collapse of Enron and Arthur Anderson. Several other examples are discussed in less depth throughout the text, however many of these are not actually predictable surprises under the definition provided. For example, global warming is discussed a number of times; however global warming has been in public discussion since the 1930s, and today a substantial majority of people believe not only the concept of global warming but that current warming is man-made. By 2050, this subject will have been under study for 120 years and popular consensus will have been achieved for 50-60 years. This is certainly predictable, but hardly a surprise. The United States' looming crisis in entitlement spending also falls in this category.
Flaws exist in other anecdotal support as well. For example, Bazerman and Watkins cite aviation security failures as an occasion when overly discounting the future lead to a predictable surprise. Quick calculation based on figures provided in the book show that, using equal discount rates for the expected future cost of security and the future cost of disaster, even with a disaster probability as high as 10% for any given year, the airlines would be ahead on a cost basis. The total destruction of both World Trade Center towers and the massive ensuing death toll was not reasonably foreseeable by the airline industry; based on the typical passenger plan carrying 78 people, this was the equivalent of an absurd 41 simultaneous aircraft disasters! Given the cost of implementation and the low probability of such a large disaster, even at a full cost of nearly $50 billion, the airlines' decision to oppose security measures on a cost basis was reasonable. The full scope of this surprise was unlikely enough that it should not be termed "predictable."
Despite some good analysis of reasons predictable surprises occur and ways to avoid them, this book is critically weakened by its lack of evidence. Bazerman and Watkins try to make it stand largely on just the aviation security and auditor independence failures; however these are insufficient evidence for their broad analysis and conclusions, particularly given the weakness of those arguments provided. This book would be substantially more persuasive with more anecdotal support.
Predictably OK  2005-05-10
In a world ruled by probability, all predictions eventually come true (no matter how impossible.) That said, ignoring the obvious can be disastrous, but the authors methods for prioritizing risk were disappointing.
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